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Abstract:  Transaction cost economics explains organizations in a simplistic ‘market-vs.-
hierarchy’ dichotomy.  In this view, complex real-world coordination forms are simply considered 
‘hybrids’ of those ‘pure’ and ideal forms, thus being located on a one-dimensional ‘line’ between 
them.  This ‘organizational dichotomy’ is mainly based on relative marginal transaction costs, 
relative lengths of value-added chains, and ‘rational choice’ of coordination form.  The present 
paper, in contrast, argues that pure ‘market’ and ‘hierarchy’, even including their potential hybrids, 
are a theoretically untenable and empirically void set.  Coordination forms, it is argued, have to be 
conceptualized in a fundamentally different way.  A relevant ‘organizational space’ must reflect the 
dimensions of a complex world such as dilemma-prone direct interdependence, resulting in strong 
strategic uncertainty, mutual externalities, collectivities, and subsequent emergent process.  This, in 
turn, will lead either to (1) informally institutionalized, problem-solving cooperation (the 
instrumental dimension of the institution) or (2) mutual blockage, lock-in on an inferior path, or 
power- and status-based market and hierarchy failure (the ceremonial dimension of the institution).  
This paper establishes emergent instrumental institutionalized cooperation as a genuine 
organizational dimension which generates a third ‘attractor’ besides ‘market’ and ‘hierarchy’, i.e., 
informal network.  In this way, an ‘organizational triangle’ can be generated which may serve as a 
more relevant heuristic device for empirical organizational research.  Its ideal corners and some 
ideal hybrids on its edges (such as ideal clusters and ideal hub&spoke networks) still remain 
empirically void, but its inner space becomes empirically relevant and accessible.  The 
‘Organizational Triangle’ is tentatively applied (besides casual reference to corporate behavior that 
has lead to the current financial meltdown), by way of a set of criteria for instrumental problem-
solving and a simple formal algorithm, to the cases of the supplier network of ‘DaimlerChrysler US 
International’ at Tuscaloosa, AL, the open-source network Linux, and the web-platforms Wikipedia 
and ‘Open-Source Car’.  It is considered to properly reflect what is generally theorized in 
evolutionary-institutional economics of organizations and the firm and might offer some insight for 
the coming industrial reconstructions of the car and other industries. 
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Introduction 
Organizational analysis has to be conducted in a theoretical and conceptual frame that 
reflects actual real-world properties of decision spaces of individual agents.  Among these, 
complexity is most prominent, pervasive, and indicative.  Complexity typically stems from 
dilemma-prone direct interdependence, resulting strong strategic uncertainty, mutual 
externalities, collectivities, and bounded rationality, which are ubiquitous dimensions of 
any social behavior.  Complexity triggers subsequent evolutionary process.  The latter, in 
turn, may lead to emergent structure, particularly to learned institutionalizations of 
cooperation which typically solve the coordination problem in situations exhibiting 
collectivities and dilemmas.  Evolutionary process, however, may also lead to mutual 
blockage, lock-in on an inferior path, or some other complicated system orbit.  (On 
complexity and emergent structure in modeling economies, see, e.g., Liebrand, Messick 
(eds.) 1996; Lindgren 1997; Foley 1998; see also Schelling 1978; Arthur 1989; Delorme 
1997.) 
Path-dependent and often cumulative search, learning and adaptation processes thus 
may lead to multiple equilibria in (formal models of) spontaneous decentralized systems, 
i.e., most basically high vs. low institutionalizations of intra-firm routines, firms’ outward 
strategies, and coordination and cooperation forms among firms.  (For the tradition of 
classical elaborations of firm behavior under uncertainty, evolutionary process, learning, 
adaptation, and routinizations, see, e.g., Schumpeter 1942; Simon 1957, 1959; Penrose 
1959; Cyert, March 1963; Nelson, Winter 1982; many modern evolutionary economists of 
the theory of the firm refer back as far as Smith and Marshall, see, e.g., Loasby 1976; Kay 
1992; Dietrich 1994; Hodgson 1998; Witt 2005). 
Proper reflection of complexity and its far-reaching implications, thus, also sheds 
light on diverse coordination mechanisms and forms and hence promotes an understanding 
of the structures of different allocation and coordination forms, their interrelations and 
potential combinations (see, e.g., Amin, Hausner (eds.) 1997; Block 2000; Langlois 2003). 
Broadening the scope of ‘coordinational’ and organizational analysis, therefore, is 
also to move beyond the world of only indirect interdependence (mediated through ideal 
prices only) that still shapes the neoclassical modeling of ideal ‘markets’, with its isolated, 
‘autistic’ agents, which still provides the benchmark coordination form of mainstream 
analysis.  While complexity is increasingly ubiquitous in the fragmented and 
interconnected real world (on increasing real-world complexity and organization, see, e.g., 
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Ruigrok, van Tulder 1995; Rycroft, Kash 1999; Langlois 2003; Elsner 2005) it is ‘reduced 
away’ in the neoclassical representation of both ideal ‘markets’ and their Coasian dual, 
hierarchy (Coase 1937).  Following Williamson (1975), the neoclassical agenda of the 
theory of the firm has been further developed as the rational choice between the (inter-
firm) ‘market’ and the intra-firm (i.e., labor, capital, intermediate products) ‘markets’ (see, 
e.g., Kay 1992).  And even after Williamson’s many concessions of heterodox themes and 
critiques (bounded rationality, history, recurrent interactions, long-run relations, relational 
investment, power, culture, etc.) during the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s (e.g., Williamson 
1985, 1993, 1995, 1996, 2003; for an in-depth discussion of those differentiations in 
Williamson’s approach, see, e.g., Groenewegen, Vromen 1997; Pessali, Fernandez 1999) 
this ideal duality still largely has served as the mainstream benchmark for evaluating real 
economies, and perhaps ever more so.  And this paradigm has remained strictly 
neoclassical:  ‘[T]here is only one causality direction--from individual actions and bilateral 
exchanges to economic structure. No reference is made […] to social processes […] TCT 
[transaction cost theory – WE] ignores social evolution […]’ (Pessali, Fernandez 1999, 
268-9, also passim; see also, e.g., Knoedler 1995; Pratten 1997). 
However, as long as one sticks to the ‘optimal’ and ‘equilibrating market’ left 
untouched, with (then in turn) ‘optimal’ hierarchies within it, one cannot fully consider 
complexity and non-optimal, non-equilibrium, and non-teleological process, emergent 
structure, and the manifold forms of coordination and organization possibly resulting (e.g., 
Wright, Mukherji 1999).  With complex structure, evolutionary process, and emergence, 
the ‘boundaries of the firm’ become not only shifting but also fuzzy, and both the vertical 
and horizontal boundaries then do not only depend on technological opportunities,  but on 
complementary capabilities, absorptive and learning capacities, and path dependencies, and 
external relations of the firm, within the ever changing environment of the whole firm 
population, become crucial to the firm’s existence and development (e.g., Dosi, Salvatore 
1992; Amin, Hausner (eds.) 1997; Hodgson, Knudsen 2000). 
This relates to both (1) the power-based big-corporation dimension (and its 
economics tradition from Veblen (1904) through Berle/Means, Schumpeter ‘2’, and 
Chandler to Galbraith), with its oligopolistic coordination and ‘centralized private sector 
planning’ (Munkirs 1985) (this tradition has stressed the power- and status-based 
ceremonial dimension of institutionalizations of coordination and organization forms), and 
(2) the knowledge-based, learning, interoperability, and standardization-oriented 
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dimension (and its economics tradition, from Schumpeter ‘1’ through Nelson/Winter) (see, 
e.g, Nonaka, Toyama 2002) (this tradition has emphasized the instrumental dimension of 
institutionalization of coordination and organization forms more strongly).  Strategy, 
power, path creation, and complex interrelatedness of firms may combine into 
cumulativity, lock in, adverse firm selections, and even whole populations of big cost-
pushers (e.g., Dosi, Gianetti, Toninelli (eds.) 1992; Hodgson 1993; Pitelis 1998; Stack, 
Gartland 2003).  And with the growth of the knowledge economy and the increasing 
requirement of a ‘socially embedded knowledge’, the neoclassical organizational 
dichotomy becomes an increasingly pointless paradigm of organizational research (e.g., 
Hodgson 2005). 
Thus, the neoclassical dichotomy, although still most virulent in the mainstream, 
does not appear to be appropriate for analyzing the manifold observed forms of business 
interdependence, coordination, and organization.  In fact, real-world economic structures 
and processes are reflected in a virtually infinite universe of complex models considering 
interactive agents, with diverse resulting processes and emergent structures, generated 
already by even rather simple initial structures (see again, e.g., Foley 1998; Watts 1999). 
Neoclassical ideal ‘markets’ with isolated individual agents (including firm hierarchies) 
then would represent just a special case somewhere at the fringes of that universe. 
In times of de-regulation and ‘dis-embedding’ of the ‘markets’, of global spatial 
and functional fragmentation of value-added chains in the face of complex products, and, 
thus, required technological interoperability and net-technologies, interdependent 
decision-making and coordination and cooperation problems have come to dominate the 
economy (see, e.g., Ruigrok, van Tulder 1995; Rycroft, Kash 1999; Pratt 1997; Elsner 
2005).  Instances of informally institutionalized cooperative forms to overcome uncertainty 
and opportunism are local clusters with their historically learned, largely price-
independent, stable and long-run interrelations as well as more or less formal strategic 
networks (see, e.g., Elsner 2000, 2009b).  Hierarchical and network forms typically 
combine into hub&spoke network forms.  However, none of these are ‘hybrids’ in the 
sense of the neoclassical dichotomy (e.g., Baudry, Gindis 2005). 
This is all well-known among heterodox schools since their intense criticisms of 
transaction cost economics during the 1990s and 2000s (e.g., Winter 1993; Groenewegen 
(ed.) 1996; Amin, Hausner (eds.) 1997; Nonaka, Toyama 2002; Hodgson 2005; Dietrich, 
Krafft 2008). 
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Against this background, this paper starts with (1) a short reconsideration of that 
conventional organizational dichotomy.  We will take the ideal ‘market-hierarchy’ 
dimension to serve as an organizational baseline, although theoretically sterile and 
empirically void.  Therefore, we will develop, in addition, (2) an organizational dimension 
that we position orthogonally to that baseline dimension and which reflects the degree of 
interactively learned institutionalization of cooperation, including cluster and network 
forms, i.e., the value of the instrumental dimension of an informally emerging institution.  
Thus, a two-dimensional organizational space will be established wherein ‘market’ and 
‘hierarchy’ receive some real-world significance and meaning as forms with instrumental 
institutional content.  Its new ‘attractor’ is ideal, learned, institutionalized cooperation, 
which provides the third ‘corner stone’ of a triangle conception, in addition to the corners 
‘Market’ and ‘Hierarchy’, the new one called (instrumental) Ideal Institutionalized 
Cooperation/Network.  While still ideal and empirically void at its corners and edges, this 
frame can serve as a heuristic to better explore both theoretical and real-world 
organizational forms.  This Organizational Triangle will subsequently be exposed to (3) 
real-world organizational forms in some short case studies that will illustrate the 
conception’s applicability and its ability not only to reflect evolutionary-institutional 
theory of the firm but to help characterize, allocate, and compare different real-world 
organizational phenomena and forms. 
 
1 The Conventional Transaction-Cost Conceptualization of Organizational 
Forms:  The Organizational Dichotomy and Its Critique 
The neoclassical approach to comparative allocation, coordination, and organization forms 
has been developed from the ‘transaction cost’ approach (Coase 1937). 
Transactions 
A transaction can basically be conceived of as an elementary economic unit of analysis 
both within and across organizations and thus has the potential to open up the ‘black box’ 
of the ‘firm’, to analyze ‘markets’ as systems of directly interdependent, institutionally 
behaving agents, and, therefore, to conceptualize ‘hierarchies’, ‘markets’, and other 
potential coordination forms as an inseparable continuum of forms of interactions.  The 
conception of the ‘transaction’ has originally been elaborated as an institutional economic 
unit by John R. Commons already before Coase (Commons 1934, Vol. I, 52-74, 336-42; 
see also, e.g., Pitelis 1998). 
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The Coasian neoclassical treatment was able to conceptualize only a dichotomy 
between two allegedly irreconcilable principles (while ‘markets’ in fact, historically, are 
not conceivable without power and hierarchy, see, e.g. Pitelis 1998).  The rational choice 
of coordination form to minimize transaction costs has led to the (artificial) market-
hierarchy dichotomy and the different real-world forms observed, particularly cluster and 
network forms, may be conceptualized therein only as hybrids between the two ideal 
poles. 
Williamson’s Affirmation of the Dichotomy 
Williamson‘s further elaboration of the issue has more or less confirmed and reinforced 
that limitation.  Although he discusses a broad range of influences on transaction costs, he 
never actually moves to complex organizational structures and processes beyond ‘rational’ 
marginal optimization and equilibrium.  Those diverse issues mentioned above are always 
made commensurable to, and in fact subsumed under, the exclusive transaction-cost 
dimension and the established organizational dichotomy.  This holds for both why 
transaction costs matter and the main components of transaction cost (see, e.g., 
Williamson, 1975, 2003; see also, e.g., Pyatt 1978). 
For example, a key factor is asset specificity of investment (in both physical and 
human capital).  Due to bounded rationality of the agents and their need to assume 
opportunistic behavior of the exchange partner, a potential for hold-up problems exists.  
These will be anticipated and be taken into account when entering a relation.  Contracts 
then are the tool to cope with this, but their inevitable incompleteness prevents addressing 
all potential problems and conflicts, particularly those arising from asymmetric 
information, mutual bounded rationality, or mutual ‘strong’ uncertainty.  Vertical 
integration (enhancing hierarchy) is offered here to be the only solution. 
However, bounded rationality, strong uncertainty, and incomplete contracts may 
also open the way for more complex forms of coordination, i.e., an elaboration of 
evolutionary process, institutional emergence, learned institutionalization of trust and 
cooperation, and related relational contracting to reduce (mutual) moral hazard and thus 
transaction costs.  Although this has been addressed by Williamson (e.g., Williamson 
1981) it has not been elaborated.  His discussion remains focused on governance 
structures to be aligned with, and neatly reducible to, transaction costs and their ‘rational’ 
economizing so that ‘the firm’ remains ‘something to be derived from comparative 
transaction cost considerations’ (Williamson 1996, 11). 
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Transaction Costs in a Complexity Perspective 
It certainly is worthwhile identifying specific transaction costs and attempting to reduce 
prohibitive transaction costs, as present in the cases of strong uncertainty, namely initial 
strong strategic uncertainty, reduced to levels where agents become capable of action, 
particularly innovative action. This, however, will be feasible only as trusting and 
correlated (joint, collective) action.  The very concept of transaction costs thus may easily 
include situations that blow up the whole neoclassical organizational dichotomy as in the 
case of strong uncertainty with prohibitive, action-blocking information costs (see, e.g., 
Groenewegen 1996, 9). 
Overcoming complex problems in evolutionary processes will be contributing to 
reducing transaction costs, and economizing on transaction costs would be a byproduct of 
solving more fundamental problems of strategic uncertainty.  However, reducing the focus 
to quantitative marginal static equilibration and ‘optimization’ of transaction costs as the 
unique objective of action, prevents a deeper analysis, including analysis of the causes and 
sources of transaction costs, particularly when agents are facing coordination and dilemma 
problems.  The perspective remains reduced to one dimension in terms of both the goal 
indicator (i.e., transaction costs) and resulting organizational forms.  Comparative 
marginal transaction costs and related choice of organizational form determine the degree 
of vertical integration, or relative lengths of the value-added chains inside vs. outside 
hierarchy, i.e., the relative size of the firm vs. the market.  This appears to fall short of 
tackling a number of questions that have surged in the real world. 
Ideal Markets and Hierarchies Without Institutions? 
Dietrich and Krafft (2008), in a recent discussion of the economics of the firm, distinguish 
two perspectives that depend on the time horizon, a short-termed and ‘passive’ 
Williamsonian view, contrasting with a long-termed focus to be found in the 
institutionalist perspective.  In the present paper we assume the institutionalist 
perspective, asking how emerging institutionalized cooperation to overcome dilemma-
prone coordination problems is reflected by organizational forms.  The conceptualization 
used in the following reflects the fact that hierarchies and real-world markets, as well as 
clusters and networks, have to be considered sets of institutions emerging from complex 
structures and evolutionary process.  ‘Markets’ and hierarchies thus are unavoidably 
embedded in some minimum institutional arrangement.  (To be sure, even the most 
‘neoliberal’, de-regulated and ‘disembedded’ market, in reality, is a result of some 
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institutionalization or ‘culture’, as would be, in the real world, the most extreme 
individualism or the most radical selfish behavior.) 
In fact, what would a ‘pure market’ without institutions be?  Not even the most 
basic bidding action would be comprehended by other agents.  In this way, even the most 
de-regulated neoliberal ‘market’ in the real world that is intended to come close to the 
ideal of perfect individualism is fundamentally different from the ‘pure market’ since it 
inevitably contains some real-world complexity and thus institutionalizations. This has 
always been the core of the understanding of ‘markets’ in evolutionary institutional 
economics (see, e.g., Neale 1994). 
Similarly, what would an ideal, ‘pure’ hierarchy without institutions be?  Nothing 
but an abstract structure of ‘top’ and ‘bottom’ positions where there would be strictly no 
institutionalized division of labor between ‘top’ and ‘bottom’ agents, i.e., no routinization 
at all.  This means that every single decision to be taken by ‘top’ agents needs to see a 
different agent (person) in the ‘top’, and correspondingly always different agents in the 
‘bottom’ positions, i.e., a permanent rotation of persons on positions.  ‘Pure hierarchy’, 
similar to a pure ‘market’, thus, would raise complexity to such a level that it would 
become virtually impossible to handle in reality. 
Thus, absurdly artificial and hardly comprehensible conceptions of ‘hierarchy’ and 
‘market’ would result if institutions were left aside.  In fact, the very notion of hierarchy as 
rule-based division of labor between ‘top’ and ‘bottom’ positions, reflected in a 
comprehensive long-run labor contract, as conceptualized also by Coasian economics, 
already implies institutions and routines (Nelson, Winter 1982, Ch. 5). 
Abstract Vanishing Points 
Nevertheless, these two highly abstract, theoretically absurd, and empirically void 
organizational principles of a completely chaotic decentralized structure (‘market’) on the 
one hand and a ‘pure’ structure of ‘top’ and ‘bottom’ positions (‘hierarchy’) on the other 
may only serve as ‘vanishing points’ in the organizational space to be developed below. 
Overall, the very essence of a realist, complex setting is still not properly theorized 
in the dimension of the ‘degree of vertical integration’ or ‘value chain-length’.  The 
integration of complexity, process, and institutionalization, reflected in the (informal) 
‘institutionalized cooperation’ or the (more formal) organizational ‘network’ dimension, 
acknowledges the firm as a strategic agent and gives room for it to fill that role in various 
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organizational ways in its recurrent interactions with other agents.  This will allow for 
comparative empirical analyses of various real-world organizational forms. 
 
2 Complexity, Evolutionary Process, and Institutional Emergence:  
Conceptualizing the Genuine Institutional Dimension and an Organizational 
Space 
Again:  An Abstract Bottom Line 
If we leave the neoclassical dichotomy as it is and if we consequently disentangle it from 
its obscure and inconsequential references to complexity, uncertainty, power, and 
institutions, it may provide, as indicated, an abstract bottom line with two abstract, 
theoretically untenable, and empirically void vanishing points.  ‘Markets’ and ‘hierarchies’ 
on this abstract dimension remain ‘pure’, i.e., without institutions.  Together with some 
abstract continuum of hybrids (with different lengths of value-added chains and degrees of 
vertical integration) it may constitute a ‘bottom-line’ organizational set which, however, is 
empirically empty. 
Of course, we will have to leave these ‘pure’ forms as soon as we consider a world 
of direct interdependencies, strong (strategic) uncertainty, dilemma-prone collectivity and 
coordination problems, resulting complexity, evolutionary process, interactively learned 
informal coordination, and emergence of institutionalized cooperation (including formal or 
informal organizational forms of networking). 
Immediately beyond the ‘bottom line’, real-world forms apply that, however, are 
fundamentally different from the ‘dismantled’ neoclassical bottom-line forms in that they 
are forms cum institutionalizations in a complex environment.  To be sure, real-world 
forms close to the neoclassical bottom line will have small values of instrumental 
institutionalization but, logically, high values of the ceremonial dimension of 
institutionalization.  The latter, in turn, implies, as mentioned, market and hierarchy 
failures such as mutual blockage, lock-in, non-action, incapability of coordination and 
collective action, due to power- and status-based forms of institutionalization. 
Dilemma-Prone Complexity as an Everyday Problem 
The relevance of the collective-good/social dilemma problem can be seen in its ubiquity as 
an everyday problem as we have argued elsewhere (e.g., Elsner 2009a).  There is in fact a 
collective-good problem involved in every single economic decision, even in the most 
simple supermarket purchase, surrounding any technological coordination problem as well, 
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be it in the fragmented value-added chain or in technology choice problems.  If a fully 
acknowledged institution already exists, then typically any agent actively contributes to the 
reproduction of the institution and of corresponding expectations of others through 
generally coordinated behavior.  However, if an agent expects another agent to behave in a 
coordinated/cooperative way there possibly exists (depending on the degree of 
individualism in the prevailing culture, on future expectations, monitoring, and reputation 
mechanisms working) a dominant incentive for her not to contribute and thus to take the 
opportunity of a potential short-run one-shot extra gain (by running away without paying, 
by somehow cheating, etc.).  Similarly, under certain circumstances, in the fragmented 
value-added chain, the incentive to free-ride by saving R&D expenses may become 
virulent.  Finally, in an Arthurian technology-choice problem with net-technologies, agents 
may be dominantly incited to free ride by waiting and choosing later (e.g., Arthur 1989). 
Generally, agents in a strongly individualistic culture may be incited to ‘defect’ in 
manifold ways, and will do so as far as the situation is not fully governed by institutions, 
including memory, monitoring and transparency, reputation building, and related 
sanctioning (if not governed at all by formal hierarchical control). 
Along these lines, we have argued elsewhere that any production, information, and 
innovation system, under conditions of fragmented value-added chains, net-technologies, 
and the collective-good character of information, can be modeled as a system of mutual 
externalities, collectivities, and cumulativity, such that it can be reconstructed as a social 
dilemma in which any transaction or simple coordination problem is embedded (Elsner 
2005). 
However, the dilemma structure often exists only ‘in the background’, while the 
observable social surface is dominated by its solutions, i.e., institutionalized arrangements.  
These may be ‘instrumental’ (i.e., problem-solving) or ceremonial or ‘locked-in’ on an 
inferior technology, or even completely mutually blocked through general free-riding and 
non-action, and this may not even be realized as such by the agents who perhaps do not 
know better.  The ‘surface’ of institutionalized everyday solutions (including lock-in and 
‘non-action’) typically is more easily visible than the complex problem structure in the 
background and its alternative potentialities. 
Common individualist decision-making, thus, in an interdependent world, may lead 
to inferior results, and ideal ‘markets’, or close-to-ideal de-regulated real markets, and the 
prices resulting in them, may fail to generate and diffuse the shared knowledge and 
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expectations required for some ‘reasonable’ outcome, i.e., overcoming the dilemma.  A 
solution (superior to mutual individualist blockage or lock-in) then may require a ‘higher’ 
form of rationality than the non-embedded market can provide by itself. 
Coordination Problems and Social Dilemmas, ‘Coordination’ and ‘Cooperation’, ‘Social 
Rules’ and ‘Institutions’ 
That ‘higher’ form of rationality allowing for shared knowledge and informal coordination 
will be an institutionalization of cooperation through a learned and ‘habitualized’ 
(habituated) social institution, in the face of a dominant incentive ‘hyper-rationally’ to 
defect.  In a dilemma-prone, decentralized system, the dilemma problem can be overcome, 
if not through formal and authoritarian mechanisms, only by ‘habitualized’ and ’semi-
conscious’ behavior.  This is because the dilemma, with its dominant incentive to defect, is 
a more severe problem than a simple coordination problem (e.g., a road traffic problem, 
typically solved by simple coordination through a simple social rule).  The coordination, 
then, has to assume the specific form of cooperation, i.e., coordination with sacrificing the 
potential short-run ‘rational’ one-shot extra gain.  The simple social rule then has to 
become an institution, i.e., rule plus endogenous sanction.  In this way and with this 
terminology it typically is depicted in prisoners’ dilemma supergame modeling (see, e.g., 
Schelling 1978; Schotter 1981; Axelrod 1984/2006; van Lange et al. 1992; Liebrand, 
Messick (eds.), 1996; Lindgren 1997; Watts 1999, Ch. 8; Jackson 2005; Eckert, Koch, 
Mitloehner 2005; Elsner 2009a) and its embedding in a carefully designed evolutionary 
‘process story’ (see Dosi, Winter 2000). 
Thus, any solution requires recurrent and sequential interaction, in historical time, 
to open up room for joint learning, mutually adapting expectations, and, with this, a path-
dependent cumulative process to solve (or not) the ubiquitous dilemma problem.  This also 
implies multiple equilibria (fixed points, attractors) among which the system may 
fluctuate.  This also applies to the organizational space to be developed in the following. 
Coordination Forms Cum Institutions:  The Organizational Space 
‘Markets’ and hierarchies, in an interdependent world, thus need to be embedded in 
learned problem-solving and stabilizing institutional arrangements in order to become 
workable and problem-solving in any meaningful societal sense. 
A de-regulated ‘market’, for instance, with little instrumental-institutional 
embedding, typically is the largest enemy of a market that has any meaningful positive 
(instrumental) effect, because of its unleashed immanent tendencies towards power 
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concentration, self-abolition, adverse distribution, trust deterioration, reduced innovation 
capacity, lock-ins, and, in the extreme, mutual blockages of any instrumental action, as we 
currently observe in the severest financial and economic crisis the world has ever seen. 
Similarly, in the real world with its fragmented, deregulated, uncertain, and 
turbulent environment where much information and innovation has assumed a public-good 
character and can not completely be appropriated, even the most powerful hierarchies turn 
out to be incapable of effectively dealing with the strong uncertainty involved (as we also 
can observe in the contemporary global economic crisis).  Hierarchies thus are forced to 
downsize while, in a double movement, they also have to accumulate ever more power in 
order to maintain some control over their increasingly turbulent environment.  Hierarchical 
power in the global corporate economy is exerted nowadays through the command over 
extensive global supplier networks, thereby multiplying the number of employees that 
‘hub’ hierarchies can command beyond their in-house labor force, i.e., hub&spoke 
networks. 
Therefore, the real-world organizational dimension builds upon direct 
interdependence and direct interaction processes, cumulatively learned and habituated 
forms of cooperation to overcome social dilemmas and solve coordination problems.  This  
applies to instrumental institutionally embedded markets, instrumentally ‘routinized’ 
hierarchies (where routines/institutions are more the learned ’gene’ rather than just the 
‘truces’ of an organization, to use Nelson’s and Winter’s (1982) ‘routines dichotomy’), and 
instrumental cluster and network forms of institutionalized coordination, the latter 
emerging from markets and among hierarchies.  For an illustration, see Figure 1. 
 
Degree of instrumental institutionalization 








       Degree of vertical integration 
       or relative lengths of value-added chains 
       inside and outside hierarchy 
 
Figure 1:  The Two Dimensions of the Organizational Space. 
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As soon as complexity and resulting informal institutions (i.e., informal cooperation) have 
to be considered, a real-world coordination form will lay within the organizational space 
rather than a hybrid in the neoclassical organizational dichotomy.  Put differently, the 
neoclassical dichotomy receives theoretical and empirical meaning only if we allocate 
empirical coordination and cooperation forms within the space that we are developing 
here. 
The new, and again ‘ideal’ (although complexity-based), corner or attractor point 
represents instrumental ideal institutionalized cooperation which reflects the collective 
solution of complex problem structures and processes, an institution to yield coordination 
through cooperation.  To be sure, this is not a morally ‘superior’ or somehow more 
‘desirable’ organizational limit point but a reflection of real-world complexities and 
organizational phenomena and their more realistic theoretical modeling. 
‘Ideal institutionalized cooperation’ also includes learned information sharing and 
thus comprises ideal open-source structures and governance as a specific case existing in 
the ‘information economy’ (see, e.g., Raymond 1999; Lerner, Tirole 2002; De Laat 2004; 
Adkisson 2004; Gallaway, Kinnear 2004; Eckert, Koch, Mitloehner 2005).  But again, 
emergent open-source cooperation forms are not expected to exist as ‘pure’, ideal forms, 
i.e., not without elements of hierarchy and ‘market’, in this framework either. 
As soon as it comes to the operationalization of the vertical scale we may refer to 
the well and long elaborated institutionalist theory of instrumental value, or Social Value 
Principle which provides sets of criteria to measure the instrumental content of systems of 
institutionalization (see Tool, 1985, 1986). 
Note that with institutionalized coordination and cooperation breaking down, we 
move down the vertical line (the perpendicular) of the Triangle.  Here, while the 
instrumental dimension becomes weaker and the ceremonial dimension dominant, we may 
easily apply another important institutionalist approach, the theory of institutional change, 
assuming a process of gradual ceremonially encapsulation of learned instrumental 
knowledge (see Bush 1987).  In such more or less instrumentally disembedded and 
ceremonially encapsulated hierarchy and disembedded and encapsulated markets all kinds 
of failures and deficiencies will indeed become dominant forms in the real world (as, 
again, the current global crises strikingly demonstrate).  Empirical coordination forms then 
would come close to the ideal neoclassical bottom line without, however, becoming 
identical with the abstract ideals. 
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The Organizational Triangle as a Heuristic 
In all, within the two-dimensional organizational space that may be constructed this way, 
we can define three ideal attractor points (corners). 
This Organizational Triangle may be considered the simplest reflection of 
complexity which seems to be reasonable beyond the over-simplistic neoclassical 
dichotomy.  As such it is intended to serve as a heuristic to analyze real-world 
organizational forms, i.e., to characterize, locate, and compare real organizational forms 






Figure 2:  The Organizational Triangle. 
 
In addition, we may assume hybrids not only between the two vanishing points of the 
neoclassical dichotomy but between each two of the three attractor points.  In this way, the 
Triangle can be further specified. 
For example, (spatial) clusters, are defined here as informal (‘functional’) 
coordination forms, reflected by repeated, relatively stable, lasting, and relatively price-
resistant exchange relations, in this way being some hybrid between ideal cooperation and 
spontaneous decentralized private interaction systems where prices play some role 
(‘markets’) (for a definition and discussion of clusters, see, e.g., Elsner 2000, 2009b).  
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Ideal clusters, therefore, will be allocated somewhere ‘halfway’ between ‘ideal 
cooperation’ and ‘ideal market’. 
Similarly, hub&spoke networks are defined here as some more formal and 
deliberately contracted (‘strategic’) forms of multilateral, project bound, and often fix-term 
cooperation (often emerging from cluster interactions which would mean a move through 
the middle of the Triangle from left to right).  Such networks share their more formal (and 
hierarchical) character with hierarchies.  Hub&spoke networks that, in reality, have come 
to dominate the global corporate economy, where big corporate hierarchies command 
many suppliers and service providers, are the prototype of a hybrid between ‘ideal 
hierarchy’ and an informal ‘ideal network’.  They are to be located ‘halfway’ between 
ideal hierarchy and ideal institutionalized cooperation (see Figure 2; for a definition of 
networks and a two-stage model of cluster-network development, see, e.g., Elsner 2000, 
2005, 2009b). 
Also, since the neoclassical ‘bottom-line’ corner ‘ideal market’ must be understood 
as a perfect atomistic structure with a maximum length of value-added chains, cars, for 
instance, could be produced just with a telephone by which the entrepreneur would 
conclude thousands of spot contracts (with realtors, construction people, suppliers, service 
providers, laborers, etc.) every day.  And if ‘ideal hierarchy’ (without ‘markets’ and 
institutions), in contrast, could be understood as a monopolistic global mega-corporation, 
embracing the whole value chain (for one good, at least) in its vertically integrated 
structure, then the ‘bottom-line’ edge would, ‘halfway’, display something like a ‘mid-
sized’ length value chain (or ‘mid-sized’ vertical integration), i.e., something like a 
‘market’ with medium-sized firms (which would display the usual failures of disembedded 
markets as explained). 
Finally, an ideal, informal, learned, cooperative open-source network without any 
hierarchy and with no price-based exchange, as indicated, would be an example of the 
ideal institutionalized-cooperation corner of the triangle. 
In this way, the Organizational Triangle can be specified not only through its two 
dimensions and its three corners but also through four ideal reference coordination forms 




3 Case Studies:  Real-World Corporate Hub&Spoke and Open-Source 
Networks Within the Triangle 
Real-World Phenomena 
This section will tentatively apply the Organizational Triangle to real-world phenomena.  
Large hierarchies, for instance, that dominate and rule the global corporate economy have 
reduced their internal value chains in order to reduce costs (see, e.g., Choi, Hong 2002) but 
have at the same time used and increased power to reduce complexity, control their 
environment, get command over an extended, often multiplied workforce, distributed all 
over the world, and stabilize their expectations.  In the neoclassical dichotomy, this would 
mean reducing and extending the firms’ value chain at the same time.  In difference to this 
(contradictory) conceptualization, hub&spoke network forms have emerged that both 
ensure a wider range of resource control at lower costs and deal with the complexities of 
information and innovation in more flexible ways (see, e.g., Armstrong 2001; Perraton 
2001).  Open source networks, on the other hand, are driven by learned reciprocity, i.e., the 
institutionalization of forms of cooperation. Both new organizational prototypes will be 
explored with real-world examples in the following. 
A Simple Metric for Survey Data 
We may apply the Triangle as a heuristic in a first step in a most simple way.  In two case 
studies, we have interviewed CEOs, managing directors, and leading experts of the hub 
firm and its suppliers in a prominent hub&spoke manufacturing network and some leading 
managers and regional experts of the open-source network of the Linux community.  We 
have surveyed their self-assessments of their organizational forms with regard to the space 
given by the Triangle.  Specifically, we have asked a series of questions that were 
considered to characterize typical relations, i.e., formal structures, informal governance 
rules, and performance, with respect to each of the three ideal forms and with special 
consideration of the instrumental and ceremonial contents of rules, routines, and 
institutions. 
Questions included addressed the spatial and social proximity among, and 
recurrence and frequency of personal contacts (interactions) with, the same agents, the role 
of prices in the interactions with other agents, the degree of hierarchy among the agents 
(relations, and specific contractual stipulations, of authority, power, control, and command 
among the agents), the degrees of learning, voluntariness, trust, reciprocity, and priceless 
exchanges, knowledge sharing, ‘gifts’ of knowledge and innovation, the time spans 
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between giving and receiving, and the efficacy of specific performances of the 
coordination and organization forms in question.  The many statements from long and 
intensive questionnaire-based interviews have been evaluated in a text analysis according 
to whether they match with the characteristics of ‘ideal market’, ‘ideal hierarchy’, or ‘ideal 
institutionalized cooperation/informal network’. 
Each statement clearly expressing a tendency towards one of the three poles of the 
Triangle counted as one point.  In a simple arithmetic transformation we have combined 
the answers that were respectively related to the three ideal forms into a metric that 
determines the location of the respective coordination forms on a rough grid in the 
Triangle.  In this way, we have gained some tentative application of the Triangle through 
some preliminary comparative subjective data. 
The transformation was carried out with the help of the following equations.  The 
functions f determine the strength of the relation of the empirical coordination form in 
question with the respective ideal vanishing points (subscripts: m = market, h = hierarchy, 
nc = informal network cooperation), which results from the answers that were given, At 
being the total number of answers obtained for one of the coordination forms, Am and Ah, 
















































AAf 1 .          (3) 
 
As can easily be seen, we have normalized both the ‘bottom-line’ (between the poles ‘ideal 
market’ and ‘ideal hierarchy’) and the height of the Triangle to one (hence the second 
summands in equations (1) and (2)) to guarantee comparability between the different 
coordination forms.  Empirical f values for hierarchy (or market), for instance, are 
measured on the bottom line (which has length 1) from 0 to 1, beginning at the market 
(hierarchy) corner, ending (with 1) at the hierarchy (market) corner.  Empirical f values for 
ideal informal network cooperation are measured along the perpendicular (which also has 
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length 1) from the upper corner down to the middle of the bottom line, starting from the 
bottom line (0) and ending at the upper corner (1).   
To give a simple numerical example, assume a supplier representative has given 14 
usable statements regarding coordination forms during the interview, 3 in favor of 
‘market’, 6 for hierarchy, 5 for ideal network cooperation.  Equts. (1) – (3) then yield a 
location of the organizational form in question at fh = 0.61 (fm = 0.39 correspondingly) on 
the bottom line (i.e., closer to hierarchy) and at fnc = 0.36 up from the bottom line on the 
perpendicular.  Thus, that organizational form would be located in the lower right half of 
the triangle. 
Case 1:  A Real-World Hub&Spoke Network – Daimler(Chrysler), Tuscaloosa, 
Alabama, and Its Suppliers 
For a long time, the Daimler(Chrysler) production facility in Alabama (the firm’s name is 
Mercedes Benz United States International – MBUSI) has been considered in the literature 
a prototype of a modern production site and supplier network in the car industry (see, e.g. 
Pohlmann 1993; Choi, Hong 2002).  Also, it was considered a tight hierarchical 
hub&spoke network with a strong hub that exerts direct influence on its suppliers 
(‘spokes’).  In order to reduce complexity through hierarchical influence on the network 
interactions, MBUSI’s site is surrounded by most of their tier-one suppliers.  Particularly, 
most of the exclusive suppliers are required by MBUSI to settle, if not directly on site, 
within a 30-mile radius.  The hub exerts extensive influence on them.  Exit and entry rules 
are fixed and managed by the hub.  The hub is able to collect information from its spokes 
without disclosing its own knowledge to them. 
Notably, the dominance of MBUSI over its tier-one suppliers is different for 
different suppliers.  The degree of dependence of the suppliers on MBUSI is surprisingly 
tightly mirrored by the geographical proximity of the suppliers’ sites to the hub’s site.  
Those suppliers that are located further off the site (none is located farther than around 120 
miles) typically do not deliver exclusively to MBUSI.  Of these, some are located exactly 
between their two main customers, mostly MBUSI and BMW, which is located in 
Spartanburg, SC.  They mostly supply the American car corporations in Detroit as well, 
though.  In fact, their contracts with MBUSI do not restrict them to supply MBUSI 
exclusively.  They are mostly located outside a 90 miles circle around the MBUSI site. 
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These did emphasize their independence in the interviews and, as expected, did 
assess the weights of the different coordination forms that are effective in their overall 
relation to MBUSI differently from the exclusive close-by suppliers. 
Management representatives from 14 companies have been interviewed.  A 
majority of the companies’ representatives and experts interviewed (including MBUSI’s 
interviewees) considered the organizational form of the MBUSI-supplier entity more 
hierarchical than ‘market’-oriented, but perhaps surprisingly also more hierarchical than 
network-oriented.  The few more non-exclusive and more distant suppliers located further 
away naturally tended to consider it more ‘market’ compared to ‘hierarchy’.  So the 
Triangle locations per company ranges from 0.38 to 0.79 (pro hierarchy) on the bottom line 
and between 0.24 and 0.53 pro ‘cooperation network’.  In all, the values are around 0.6 
‘pro hierarchy’ (i.e., 0.4 ‘pro market’) and 0.35 ‘pro network’ (for the details of the 
extensive case study on the MBUSI structure, see Hocker 2008).  So the overall subjective 
allocation of the MBUSI supplier network in the Triangle shows a clear tendency towards 
the ideal hub&spoke network, as might have been expected (see Figure 3 at the end of the 
section). 
Case 2:  A Real-World Open-Source Network – Linux 
The economic literature has devoted a huge amount of analyses to the phenomenon of 
open-source production and innovation, as a more general economic principle and even an 
upcoming business model, potentially applicable even in major areas of manufacturing 
(e.g., Raymond 1999; Adkisson 2004; De Laat 2004; Gallaway, Kinnear 2004; Elsner 
2005; Wendel de Joode 2005).  Recently, open-source seems to expand into all kinds of 
online content generation (characterized by the umbrella term ‘Web 2.0’).  Over all, it 
appears to be an ‘anomaly’ to neoclassical mainstream economics, although some 
individualistic ‘rational’ reconstructions of many phenomena can perhaps be made (see, 
e.g., Lerner, Tirole 2002). 
The famous Linux ‘community’ or network as its prototype is characterized by 
relationships among its members that are considerably less based on hierarchy and more on 
informal learned institutionalized cooperation including reciprocity and gift exchange.  
Knowledge seems to be successfully governed more as a collective good.  Digital 
microelectronic information has virtually become subject to non-exclusion, rendering 
information a full-fledged collective good ubiquitously open to individualistic free-riders. 
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According to the extensive and still growing literature on Linux (see, e.g., Foray 
1988; Cohendet et al. 2001; McKelvey 2001), the network structure is characterized by 
several minor ‘hubs’ that typically just moderate the exchange processes among the 
participants without being able to put any pressure on them.  The network seems to have 
triggered fast exchange, joint learning, effective routinization and institutionalization of 
cooperation, emerging from ‘dense’ repeated interaction. 
Mailing lists and news sites frequently report on programmers who have earned 
professional credit and personal trust.  Thus the reputation mechanism seems to be an 
indicator of a long-run rationality in the theoretical framework of a prisoners’ dilemma 
supergame, specifically in a stochastic population approach where active partner selection 
is possible and will be based on monitoring and reputation chains (cf., e.g., Elsner 2005, 
2009a). 
The ‘Linux-paradigm’ can be seen as an approach towards ‘ideal, institutionalized 
cooperation’ in the Triangle.  However, as a real-world coordination form it obviously 
cannot be expected to perfectly conform to the ideal.  For instance, hierarchy may interfere 
with the cooperative network in the sense that an increasing number of private corporations 
enter the open-source world, use it as an additional external knowledge source, and Linux 
hackers are being poached by them.  Finally, the Linux kernel itself, basically privately 
owned by Linus Thorvalds, is likewise well managed by a small group of well-selected 
core members of the community, with clearly defined hierarchical competences to decide 
over the basics of the further development of the source code.  Thorvalds watches over the 
contributions to the kernel and a limited number of developers exclusively gets together for 
some time to create a patch to fix a kernel problem before the problem is made generally 
available (see, e.g., Thorvalds 2006).  We have critically considered the viability of ideal 
self-governing (open source) networks and their need to be supported and stabilized 
through ‘enlightened’ and proactive public policies (see, e.g., Elsner 2001, 2005). 
Against this background, leading representatives of the Open Source Development 
Laboratories (OSDL) in Portland, OR, and leading representatives of more informal 
regional Linux communities in Germany have been interviewed the same way as explained 
in the MBUSI case above (for the details of the structures of the community and the 
interviews, see again Hocker 2008).  All results allocate the Linux community, with some 
variance for the different groups (central and local) interviewed, in the upper half of the 
Triangle, more or less close to the ideal.  Interestingly, the OSDL central hub considers the 
 22
community considerably closer to the ideal (fnc around 0.73) than the average of the 
German local groups (around 0.54).  Both also see the community slightly on the side of 
the ‘market’ rather than hierarchy (around 0.48/0.52 ‘pro market’ in the case of OSDL, 
0.44/0.56 in the case of the average of the German local groups).  Members of the German 
local Linux groups see tendencies towards the ‘market’ because of the software industry’s 
interest in Linux hackers.  Some of them have turned their hobby into a commercial career. 
On the other hand, OSDL is a non-profit organization which might explain the more 
stronger evaluation of its representatives in favor of the ideal.  Overall, Linux is located at 
the coordinate values fnc=0.58 and fm/fh=0,58/0,42.  See Figure 3 again for a graphic 
depiction of the results. 
Cases 3 and 4:  Other Internet Open-Source Networks – Wikipedia and OScar 
Examples that might even come closer to the ‘ideal institutionalized cooperation’/ideal 
informal network are Wikipedia and the internet-based approach to manufacture an ‘open-
source’ car, OScar.  These two shall be shortly considered here for a very tentative 
allocation in the Triangle. 
The online-encyclopedia Wikipedia works without central guidance, everybody can 
easily add or change information and someone else can add more and suggest further 
changes.  Also, ‘commercial’, ‘monetary’, or ‘market’ factors do not influence Wikipedia.  
Of course, it is open to extensive free-riding as it is based on the contributions made by 
anonymous volunteers who publicly share their knowledge.  Due to unrestricted entry and 
usage, Wikipedia comes close to the ideal of an open-source network. 
Since there is no control of contributions (i.e., of topics) it may seem likely that the 
most widely shared knowledge occupies the largest space in Wikipedia and that this would 
not necessarily be the most correct or cutting-edge.  Accordingly, in that case, Wikipedia 
would represent the average knowledge of the ‘masses’, including all kinds of ‘folkviews’, 
ceremonial beliefs, etc.  However, preliminary research suggested that compared to a 
traditional hardcopy encyclopedia, Wikipedia provides more recent, more specific, and 
more cutting-edge knowledge. 
Thus, with even less hierarchy, less central management, and less ‘structure’ than 
Linux, and with its apparently high-quality open-source knowledge base it appears to be 
even closer to the ideal open-source informal network structure.  We do not attempt a 
detailed exploration of Wikipedia here, nor have applied a questionnaire to members of the 
Wikipedia community as in the cases 1 and 2.  But indications suggest that Wikipedia is 
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based on some institution of informal cooperation, reciprocity, and voluntary knowledge 
sharing.  Therefore, we would tentatively locate Wikipedia closer to the ideal informally 
institutionalized network cooperation in the Triangle (see Figure 3 below). 
The OScar-project builds a bridge between the global hub&spoke structures of 
usual car manufacturing and the informal open-source networks in software and online 
content production.  Different from Linux and Wikipedia, OScar can be seen as an attempt 
to develop a tangible product through open internet exchange (for details, see e.g., 
Giussani 2007; OScar 2009; also Honsig 2006).  OScar aims at developing a car without an 
engineering centre, without a boss, without money, and without borders, but with the help 
of the creativity in the internet based on voluntary participation of car engineers, designers, 
colleges, ‘hackers’, and even conventional companies (see, e.g., motorauthority 2008 for 
BMW’s recent initiative for some open source in car manufacturing).  A first prototype is 
targeted for the end of a period of three years.  The principles of the OScar community 
include guidelines for the interaction between its members such as ‘everyone has a voice’, 
‘knowledge is free’, or ‘the intelligent majority decides’.  Such governance rules should 
qualify OScar to be located rather close to the institutionalized-cooperative ideal in the 
Triangle.  However, since the platform is managed by a central small group of people with 
a set of formal rules (that of course can not be enforced) OScar would have to be located 
somewhat below Wikipedia, and with its lacking ownership and spatial structures perhaps 












Figure 3:  MBUSI, Linux, Wikipedia, and OScar in the Organizational Triangle 
 
4 Comparative Organizational Positions 
Having tentatively located real-world organizational forms in the Triangle, a short 
consideration of their comparative combinations of properties may be in order. 
Knowledge Sharing, Common Information Management, and Network Governance 
A point that is noteworthy stems from the fact that the organization of production in 
supplier networks to meet complexity and cost-reduction requirements makes it difficult 
for assemblers to pursue proprietary innovations.  Since fragmented value-added chains, 
information and innovation as collectivities, required standardization, and network forms 
of sourcing and supplying largely prevent keeping innovations as a business secret 
(‘inappropriability’ of investment in knowledge creation), especially where suppliers serve 
more than one assembler, a change in the companies’ strategies may be required for both 
keeping up their competitive advantage and high efficacy and performance in a regional, 
national, and societal sense.  Corresponding ‘progressive’ value-added chain and supplier 
network governance rules would require levels of learned trust that allow for the outflow 
of positive externalities from the firm in question to other agents and reverse inflows from 
them so that profits may be reduced by inevitable outflows but will be compensated by 
 25
inflows.  In this way, the social dilemmas of production, innovation, and information 
generation involved could be ‘managed’. 
Open Source for Manufacturing:  An Organizational Perspective for the Car Industry? 
In this respect, it would be interesting to investigate the opportunities to transfer open-
source experience from the software and internet industries into large-scale manufacturing 
networks that typically are of the hub&spoke type.  The very existence of a manufacturing-
oriented internet network such as OScar, with its cutting-edge green car prototype, can be 
considered an attempt to transfer the specific advantages of cooperatively institutionalized 
open-source information systems into traditional manufacturing.  Some open source, 
although in different degrees and pushed by very different corporate motives, in fact, is 
beginning to show in a broad wave of business strategies in an increasing number of 
industries and corporations (see, for instance, Microsoft’s new strategy or the BMW open-
source initiative mentioned above).  Global corporate car manufacturing might indeed 
profit from more interactively learned and institutionalized ‘open’ structures in order to 
reduce transaction costs, broaden and accelerate innovation, and finally ‘greening’ their 
products by way of broader participation.  A first-step requirement for the strategy to 
organize production processes in greater consistency with complexity structures may be a 
more ‘open’ approach to communication, i.e., the inclusion of suppliers, services, and other 
stakeholders, including public agents, into development processes at an early stage, as this 
may initialize, accelerate, or stabilize social learning processes among agents.  In this way, 
it might increase product quality and speed up innovation.  Networks’ ‘speed strategies’ 
are already well known from the literature on effective clustered regions.  For example, an 
intense cooperation between a number of suppliers of MBUSI that were more independent 
and located further away from the hub indicates that suppliers indeed may be willing to 
collaborate if they are given the opportunity to do so.  On the other hand, it was reported 
by several suppliers of MBUSI that they receive orders not from their own headquarters 
and not even from MBUSI at Tuscaloosa but from the Daimler headquarters in Germany.  
Finally, the contracts applied by Daimler to its suppliers stipulate that they can be replaced 
on an annual basis.  Long-term and trust-based contractual agreements, in contrast, could 
not only lower transaction costs but reduce uncertainty for all, extend planning horizons 
and thus make investments in interactive learning and institutionalization of trust and 
cooperation rational.  Stable institutionalized relations and expectations may be expected to 
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motivate proactive and creative behavior of suppliers with a positive impact on the 
innovative and learning capacity of the network. 
 
5 Conclusion 
The Organizational Triangle, in its institutional dimension and cooperative vanishing point, 
reflects complexity, social dilemma, strong uncertainty, recurrent interactions, evolutionary 
process, and possibly interactive learning, emergent institutions of cooperation, reciprocity, 
stabilization of trust, common knowledge, reduced transaction costs, and high 
performance.  Evolutionary process, however, may also lead to a downward spiraling, 
possibly ending in lock-in, collective inability of action, mutual blockage, distrust, and 
institutionalization of power- and status-based ceremonial values, behaviors, and 
individualistic strategies, mirrored in cumulative organizational and collective failure.  
Theoretical examples in the broad evolutionary literature have been issues of ‘unintended 
consequences’, ‘fallacy of aggregation’, herd behavior, etc.  The contemporary financial 
meltdown, beginning real-economic depression, and cumulative global crises in resources, 
food supply, climate, poverty and distribution, and last not least moral behavior of the 
‘elites’ are current striking instances of collective organizational failure, i.e., the lack of 
coordination and cooperation, or collectivity, to mirror and meet interdependence, 
complexity, and dilemma. 
The Triangle, thus, takes real-world problem settings and agents into account.  The 
neoclassical theory of organization, in contrast, with its simplistic organizational 
dichotomy, despite Williamson’s many attempts to integrate critical issues, cannot 
sufficiently capture and conceptualize this. 
Real-world organizational structures, representative of typical hub&spoke 
structures in large-scale manufacturing and of internet-based open-source structures, have 
been explored here as examples of the real diversity of organizational forms with different 
mixtures of basic principles.  Their characterization and comparative location in the 
Triangle has illustrated that real-world structures are indeed complex hybrids of ‘market’, 
‘hierarchy’, and ‘institutionalized cooperation/informal network’.  Markets and hierarchies 
then are no longer ideals but in their very combination with institutionalizations have 
become something fundamentally different, namely institutionally embedded, 
multidimensional, complex, evolving and open-ended, and empirically accessible real-
world forms. 
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Therefore, in a world of ubiquitous interdependence, coordination and cooperation 
problems, the dominant belief in the full accountability of stand-alone firm hierarchies, 
with their strategies of ever more power exertion to deal with increasing global turbulence, 
and of self-regulating ‘markets’, however dis-embedded, de-regulated, and ceremonially 
dominated, does not appear to be economically sustainable both for business and the 
economy as a whole.  For instance, in the MBUSI case, trying to keep innovations within 
the boundaries of the firm appeared to cause high and rising contractual costs. 
Consideration of comparative location in the Triangle, thus, suggests that taking on 
open-source experience in manufacturing might improve, initialize, accelerate, stabilize, 
and broaden innovation, not only for the economy as a whole and not only for the 
independent small and medium-sized firms involved but in the last instance even for the 
big powerful global corporations. 
Obviously, this analysis, and particularly the transfer of best socio-economic 
experience into a broad range of industries, would have to be combined with proper 
‘institutional design’ by a (more enlightened) public agent.  Proper institutional design 
would include interaction, learning, coordination, cooperation, and network support 
through proper shaping of the incentive structures and of the future expectations (‘futurity’, 
as established by Commons 1934), as we have elaborated elsewhere (e.g., Elsner 2001), 
and, finally, proper formal market regulation. 
In sum, we have developed an Organizational Triangle based on, determined, and 
operationalized by two ideal theoretical dimensions, three ideal organizational principles, 
and three more ideal hybrid examples located ‘halfway’ on its edges.  Real-world 
organizations, through their real hybrid character, turn out to be something fundamentally 
different from the ideals, and in this way become empirically accessible through this 
simple heuristic.  This Triangle can be fruitfully applied to diverse real-world 
organizations in comparative allocations within its organizational space, as we have briefly 
illustrated.  Thus we can identify, characterize, and compare real-world organizational and 
governance structures.  The Organizational Triangle thus may also provide a frame to 
apply evolutionary-institutional analysis, including the institutional dichotomy, the social 
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